THE DEFENCE OF INSANITY IN CRIMINAL TRIAL: THE LINDSAY CLANCY CASE AND THE NIGERIAN POSITION
Under the Nigerian Criminal Jurisprudence, just as with provocation, the defence of insanity occupies a technical position. It can become more technical in the modern age prevalence of mental-health conditions. While the law recognises that a person who is mentally incapable of understanding or controlling his or her conduct should not ordinarily be held criminally responsible, the defence of insanity may or may not excuse for criminal conduct on the ground that the accused suffered from a mental-health condition.
The recent trial of Lindsay Clancy in Massachusetts, United States of America, provides a useful basis for examining this issue in the Nigerian context. Clancy, a former labour and delivery nurse, was accused of killing her three young children, Cora (5), Dawson (3), and Callan (8 months). Her defence was substantially predicated on postpartum psychosis and the allegation that she heard a “male voice” commanding her to kill her children and subsequently herself.
There was evidence that her mental health had deteriorated following the birth of her third child in May 2022. She experienced depression, suicidal thoughts, and other psychiatric symptoms and received treatments and several medications. She was briefly hospitalized in January 2023, shortly before the killings. The prosecution challenged that account, particularly because she had previously received mental-health treatment but had not reported hearing any male voices to her therapists or other treating professionals. Some clinicians who assessed her reportedly did not find any evidence of psychosis nor consider her an imminent danger at the time of the killings.
Eventually, the jury became deadlocked as they could not arrive at a verdict, resulting in a mistrial. The prosecution is at liberty to conduct a retrial or negotiate a plea deal or withdraw the charges completely.
This article is not a position on the outcome of the trial, as no decision was reached by the Massachusetts Court, but an exposition of the defence of insanity and infanticide, to an extent, using the case as a focal point.
THE NIGERIAN POSITION ON INSANITY
Under section 28 of the Criminal Code, a person is not criminally responsible where, at the time of the act, mental disease or natural mental infirmity deprives that person of the capacity to understand what he or she is doing, control his or her actions, or know that the act ought not to be done.
By this section, the term mental-health is not outrightly mentioned, however, mental disease and natural mental infirmity may be open to vagaries of circumstances which perhaps can translate to legal insanity.
While the law requires more than proof that a defendant suffered depression, anxiety, postpartum difficulties or another psychiatric condition, the defendant must establish that the condition affected his or her legally relevant mental capacity at the time of the offence.
Considering the fact that one of the deceased children in Clansy’s case was 8 months old, under the Nigerian legal regime, the killing of the child by a woman would be considered as infanticide if the basis for the killing is due to failure to recover from the effect of lactation which is consequent upon the birth of the child. What this presupposes is that the woman may be suffering from hormonal imbalance because of lactation leading the balance of her mind being disturbed.
Nigerian courts have considered the defence of insanity in a plethora of cases, and have carefully distinguished between genuine legal insanity, mental abnormality and mere delusion. In Ani v. The State (2002) 10 NWLR (Pt. 776) 644, the a woman was charged with the murder of two children while she raised insanity as a defence.
The Supreme Court examined the woman’s conduct before, during and after the killings. Her actions in locating the children, attacking them and subsequently attempting to evade the police were considered relevant to whether she understood the nature and wrongfulness of her conduct. The Supreme Court, in unanimously dismissing her appeal, ultimately rejected the defence of insanity.
This case demonstrates that Nigerian courts will look beyond a claim of mental abnormality and examine the actual conduct of the defendant before and after the offence.
Similarly, in Arisa v. The State (1988) 4 NWLR (Pt. 88) 725, the Supreme Court clearly articulated the legal test for insanity. The Supreme Court held that it is insufficient merely to establish that a defendant suffered from a mental disease or natural mental infirmity. The defendant must additionally establish that, as a result of that condition, he was deprived of the capacity to understand what he was doing, control his actions, or know that he ought not to do the act.
The Supreme Court therefore rejected the proposition that mental illness simpliciter equals insanity in law. The appellant failed to discharge the burden, and his conviction was affirmed.
Although the facts of the foregoing case are indeed distinguishable from that of Clancy, it is relevant to bear in mind that where postpartum psychosis is accepted as a medical condition, the legal question would remain whether it indeed produced the incapacity required by section 28.
Further, in Ngene Arum v. The State (1979) 11–12 SC 91, the Supreme Court drew an important distinction between insanity and delusion. The court held that where a person is merely suffering from a delusion, the delusion does not necessarily relieve him of criminal responsibility. The reaction to the delusion must itself satisfy the requirements of the law.
The foregoing cases may have been old cases that are somewhat far from current realities, the statutory provision of the law remains that hearing a voice or experiencing a hallucination may not qualify for legal insanity. The court must still determine its effect upon the Defendant’s legally recognised mental capacities and while the prosecution would seek to negate such narrative, the Defendant must do all the work to bring the narrative within the meaning of section 28.
It is important to bear in mind that the standard of proof for any defence to criminal liability is on the balance of probabilities and not beyond a reasonable doubt, while the advantage for the Defendant is that every doubt in the proof of the elements of a crime is to be resolved in favour of the Defendant.
Taking into consideration the facts of Clancy’s case, one would reckon that postpartum psychosis is a serious psychiatric condition that calls for awareness and attention through policies, legislation, and a functional system to address the issue. However, the distinction that has been made under the Nigerian criminal jurisprudence must be borne in mind as well. While section 28 of the Criminal Code Act is generic on the defence of insanity which can be used in a broad sense, the provision of section 327 of the same Act dwells more on what can be termed as hormonal imbalance arising from childbirth and lactation following childbirth.
By section 327, the Nigerian legal framework reckons with the fact that a woman can cause the death of a less than 12 months old child due to the balance of her mind being disturbed by reason of her not recovering fully from the effect of giving birth to the child or by reason of the effect of lactation. Although the defence only mitigates the punishment to that of manslaughter, it is safe to say that there is an indirect recognition of postpartum psychosis under the Nigerian law.
The reason for the section 327 not providing full exculpation may be that if the law considers hormonal changes following childbirth, without more, as sufficient to excuse criminal conduct, the law could potentially open the floodgates of claims based on postpartum changes, sleep deprivation, emotional distress and other physiological or psychological conditions, which, in themselves, may not deprive a person of the mental capacity to distinguish right from wrong.
What this means is that hormonal changes may form part of the medical explanation for a defendant’s condition, but under the Nigerian legal regime, they do not automatically establish legal insanity. Therefore, the laws on insanity should be reviewed and updated to modern realities, especially when there is now a plethora of mental health-related illnesses which were not considered in the enactment of section 28 of the Criminal Code.
Kamarudeen O. Abdullahi, Esq.,
Associate II, Unit Head, Litigation, Election Petition, and Dispute Resolution (LED) Practice Group